Vultee Vengeance - development, overview and US Service

Vultee Vengeance - development, overview and US Service


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Vultee Vengeance - development, overview and US Service

The Vultee Vengeance was a dive bomber originally purchased by the French, and that entered production for the RAF, but that didn't reach service until the concept of the dedicated dive-bomber had been discredited. The original French order was rather over-ambitious. It called for 300 aircraft, with deliveries to begin in October 1940, but the Vengeance didn’t make its maiden flight until March 1941.

The dramatic German victories of May and June 1940 saw the Stuka dive bomber gain a fearsome reputation as it swooped over the battlefields of Belgium and France. With this in mind the British Purchasing Commission decided to look for a dive bomber in the United States, and found that the Vengeance was the only one available. The first control, for 200 aircraft, was placed on 3 July 1940, and was followed by a second order, for 100 aircraft, on 2 December 1940. A third order, for 400 aircraft, was placed in April 1942 and a fourth, for 200 aircraft, in June. On 28 June both of these orders became part of the lend-lease scheme, and the Vengeance was given the USAAF designation A-31.

The first prototype (RAF serial number AF745) was completed with twin fins and rudders, but after the taxing trials the test pilot refused to fly it in that configuration. It was then given a single fin and rudder, similar to that used on the Vultee Vanguard fighter, and that had already been installed on the second aircraft. AF745 made its maiden flight on 30 March 1941.

Deliveries of the Vengeance began early in 1942. By this date the Stuka had lost its fearsome reputation, and it had become clear that the dive-bomber was very vulnerable if it faced modern fighter aircraft - the Germans had soon been forced to withdraw the type from the Battle of Britain, and the Vengeance would have been very vulnerable against the Bf 109 or Fw 190.

Like many aircraft not needed in Britain the Vengeance was sent to the Far East, where it served with the RAF and Indian Air Force over Burma, and with the RAAF in New Guinea.

In February 1943 the Vengeance was described by Major General Davenport Johnson, Director of Military Requirements for the USAAF, as 'a shining example of the waste of material, man-power, and time in the production of an airplane which this office has tried to eliminate for several months'. Production of the Vengeance apparently only survived into 1943 because it contributed towards the production target of 107,000 military aircraft to be produced during the year. It had an awful reputation - most pilots found it difficult to fly and a poor dive-bomber, although more experienced pilots reported that it was viceless and fully aerobatic.

Description

The Vengeance was a tandem two-seater, carrying a pilot and rear gunner. The Model 72 was powered by a 1,600hp Wright GR-2600-A5B-5 Cyclone radial engine, and was armed with six .30in guns, two flexibly mounted guns in the rear cockpit and four fixed guns in the wings. It could carry two 500lb in the fuselage bomb bay as standard load, and another two 250lb bombs at overload weight.

The aircraft had a W-shaped wing. The wing centre panels had a swept back leading edge and straight trailing edge, while the outer panels had a straight leading edge and swept-forward trailing edge. The wings had slotted all-metal dive-brakes on the undersaide of the outer panels.

Overview of Variants

Production of the Vengeance fell into three main categories. Aircraft produced before lend-lease were designated as the V-72 in the United States and the Mk I (for aircraft produced by Northrop) and II (produced by Vultee) by the RAF.

Aircraft produced to the same standards after the start of lend-lease were given the USAAF designation A-31 and the RAF designations Mk IA (Northrop) and III (Vultee).

Aircraft produced with American equipment and 0.50in guns were given the American designation A-35 and the RAF designation Mk IV.

Production Totals

Designation

Company

Number

Notes

Mk I

Northrop

200

1st and 2nd British orders

Mk IA/ A-31-NO

Northrop

200

4th British order

Mk II

Vultee

500

1st, 2nd and 3rd British orders

Mk III (A-31C)

Vultee

100

A-35A (V88)

Vultee

99

A-35B

Vultee

831

TOTAL

1,930

United States Service V-72 Vengeance

The Vultee V-72 was the designation given to those pre-lend lease aircraft that were taken over from British orders by the USAAF after the American entry into the Second World War.

The four squadrons of the 312th Bombardment Group (386th, 387th, 388th and 389th Bombardment Squadrons) used the V-72 alongside the A-24 in 1942-43. Between December 1942 and February 1943 the group flew a number of anti-submarine patrols,

The 311th Bombardment Group (Dive) used the V-72 while it was training in the United States. Its three squadrons were then known as the 382nd, 383rd and 384th Bombardment Squadrons. The V-72s were replaced by A-36s and P-51s before the group moved to India. The group eventually became the 311th Fighter Group and its squadrons the 528th, 529th and 530th Fighter Squadrons.

The V-72 was also used during 1942 for training by the four squadrons of the 84th Fighter Group (then the 84th Bombardment Group). As with the 311th these squadrons were initially designated the 301st, 302nd, 303rd and 304th Bombardment Squadrons, but became the 496th, 497th, 498th and 491st Fighter Squadrons before entering combat).

The same was true of the 306th Bombardment (later 500th Fighter) and 308th (502nd Fighter) Squadrons, both part of the 85th Bombardment Group, and the 307th Bombardment (501st Fighter) Squadrons, part of the 345th Bombardment Group.

Vultee Vengeance Mk I (Model 72)
Engine: Wright GR-2600-A5B-5 Cyclone
Power: 1,700hp
Crew: 2
Wing span: 48ft
Length: 40ft
Height: 12ft 10in
Loaded Weight: 12,480lb
Max Speed: 279mph
Cruising Speed: 250mph
Service Ceiling: 24,300ft
Range: 1,200 miles
Armament: Four 0.30in guns in wings and two 0.30in flexibly mounted guns in rear cockpit
Bomb-load: 1,500lb


Vultee Vengeance - development, overview and US Service - History

Case History of the R-2600 Engine Project
Compiled by the Historical Office,
Air Technical Service Command (Wright Field), January 1945
Edited and Rewritten by AEHS member Jay Smith

Wright R-2600 (Wikimedia Commons)

"Case History of R-2600 Engine Project" documents problems of the Wright R-2600 familiar to those who fly behind Lycomings and Continentals: cylinder corrosion, piston ring wear, excessive oil consumption. The original report, like all ATSC Case Histories, consists of a (9-page) summary, a (37-page) brief, and a file of supporting documents.

The R-2600, designed and produced by the Wright Aeronautical Corporation, originated from the company's specification #439, September 23, 1936. The Air Corps bought one experimental engine for $40,000 in October 1936. The Air Corps Materiel Division tested the engine March 10 to May 24 of 1936. The Chief of the Experimental Engineering Section at Wright Field then recommended the R-2600 as an approved engine type. Authority for Purchase #149860 provided for 467 R-2600-3 engines on contract W535 AC-12061 for $4,857,582.70.

When the contract was placed, the R-2600 was not fully developed and occasioned much trouble before becoming an outstanding engine. There were, as late as October 1943, accessory drive gear failures, cylinder failures (caused by corroded or rusting barrels), supercharger clutch failures, and excessive oil consumption.

One of the earliest problems was that of carburetor failure. The calibration of a model test engine in May 1939 engine test found the Stromberg PD carburetor to be too small. Wright Field requested the development of a larger one. The R-2600-3 series engine failed its 150-hour type test (July 1939), largely because of the PD carburetor: the engine failed to develop 1,350 rated BHP at 5,500 feet or 1,275 BHP at 12,000 feet. Two other carburetors were tried, the Stromberg PD-12J1 and Holley 1685. A Holley carburetor fitted to the Model -9 series engines finally solved the problem. Wright Aeronautical believed that the Holley carburetor (type unspecified) would aid "in curing the&hellipfaulty carburetor distribution and overheating" problems. Overheating was not so cured.

Carburetor problems caused R-2600-29 engine failures in A-20K airplanes[1], making them unfit for ferrying, reported the British Air Commission October 1944. Holley HA carburetors replaced Holley HB units, allowing ferrying. The Air Transport Command would not ferry B-25s to Hawaii for the same reason. Installation of Holley HA carburetors permitted ferrying. The carburetors (150) were returned after each trip for reuse!

Cylinders and Oil Consumption

Other hard-to-solve problems were piston and piston ring wear and excessive oil consumption.

In August 1939 during testing a 19-hour test engine failed: number 2 cylinder piston burned through near the exhaust valve, and rings in cylinders 2, 5, 6 and 10 were stuck. New pistons and tapered rings did not solve the problem. Navy testing showed first and second rings broken in number 2 cylinder, the top ring in number 5 cylinder broken and sticking, several top rings beginning to stick, and several second and third rings with tapers worn off.

Thirteen of thirty-three A-20B airplanes[2] (for delivery to Oran, Africa) landed elsewhere in December 1942 because of broken and stuck piston rings and high oil consumption.

Douglas A-20A
(Wikimedia Commons)

Similar failures happened to other aircraft using the R-2600 engine (B-17, A-31 [3], and A-35 [4]). Reports from Brazil in January 1943 stated that A-31s delivered to Army Air Force bases were mostly "out of commission" from fouled spark plugs and excessive oil consumption. High engine temperature may have accelerated piston ring wear.

Vultee A-31 Vengeance
(Australian War Memorial)

In March 1943 a Special Piston Ring Committee investigated these failures.

During Army maneuvers in Louisiana seven of twenty-six engines in A-20A airplanes were changed because of high oil consumption. The RAF in June 1943 reported Middle East delivery delays of R-2600-powered airplanes because of a "prohibitive rate of oil consumption." The RAF proposed that oil consumption could be minimized by restricting power during the first ten hours of engine life. The U. S. Army Air Forces had the same idea, earlier.

Cylinder Rust and Corrosion

The most vexing problem was rust and corrosion in the cylinders. The Corrosion Committee, established by CTI-1325 (May 17, 1943) wrote, "We do not know the answer but are beginning to suspect Gremlins." The FBI checked for sabotage. The "epidemic" of December 1942 to March 1943 was corrosion, and that of June-July 1943, rust.

The earliest corrosion complaint came on December 15, 1942 from Army Air Forces Headquarters in North Africa: many A-20 aircraft arrived "at Accra in such condition as to require all cylinders to be changed." "Rust and gum&hellipaccumulate[d] in cylinder bases to the extent that ring and cylinder wear accelerated beyond all reasonable service experience." The cause may have been airplanes left for several weeks without engines being turned over or "any other protective maintenance service." The 27th Light Bombardment Group at Baton Rouge, Louisiana found R-2600 cylinders and pistons of A-20s "badly pitted (corroded)", necessitating changing all engines. Welleston, Atlanta, and Memphis complained of "rusty" cylinders. Pratt & Whitney blamed moisture applied to steel parts during engine assembly by ungloved hands.

The Wright Field&rsquos Aircraft Modification Section disagreed. The corrosion varied from rust to severe pitting which feathered the rings. Investigators decided this resulted from "peculiarities incident to the installation in the A-20." Socony Vacuum metallurgists believed the corrosion was from weakness in the [cylinder] nitriding process. The Corrosion Committee recommended compliance with Specification AN-C-80 which should largely eliminate corrosion. Nevertheless the rust problem became serious in June 1943 General Chidlaw wrote (July 23, 1943) General Echols that the corrosion problem was "not yet licked." "This [was] plain old red rust in contradictinction to the corrosion discoloration nitriding problem," General Chidlaw wrote. Depleted stocks of high-alloy steel, it was suggested, necessitated the substitution of rust-prone plain carbon steel. The problem became more serious and the FBI was asked in August to investigate. The FBI reported September 22, 1943 no sabotage. Meanwhile Wright Field's Engineering Division announced August 3, 1943 that a mixture of 75% new oil and 25% rust preventive compound solved the problem. On September 7, 1943 a Memorandum Report specified a modified Bakelite varnish be sprayed and baked on all steel parts.

Other problems surfaced during the third 150-hour model test of April 1940:

  • The engine did not develop manufacturer's rated horsepower at altitude
  • Cylinder hold-down studs broke
  • Gears failed
  • Oil leaked from the oil tank, past the oil pump and into the engine in excess of one pound an hour

In other tests, the staked screws that held the diffuser plate to the supercharger rear housing loosened and entered the impeller.

Quality tests at the Power Plant Laboratory, Wright Field, and at Wright Aeronautical Corporation recommended changes to R-2600-29 engines (replacing R-2600-13 engines in B-25s):

  • Silver pre-fit master rod bearings instead of copper-lead bearings
  • Rolled thread cylinder hold-down cap screws in place of ground thread screws
  • A redesigned high speed clutch housing
  • New clutch plates in the low blower clutch
  • Intermediate impeller drive shaft

The R-2600-31 engine passed its 150-hour model test (Army-Navy Specification #9502-B) November 1943. Some parts showed "scratching, pitting, or picking out." These weren't considered serious and on January 26, 1944 Wright Field&rsquos Power Plant Laboratory recommended the R-2600-31 for satisfactory completion of the 150-hour model test, except for unsatisfactory wear of piston pins and intermediate impeller shaft bushings.

By November 1944 failures of reduction gear pinion bushings and piston pin retainers in R-2600-B engines were so serious that Wright Aeronautical was holding all engines[5]. All engines shipped after October 25, 1944 were returned to Wright&rsquos Lockland plant for no-cost replacement of unsatisfactory parts. An approved change of design was expected to fix these failures.

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Contents

Vultee submitted a proposal in response to a U.S. Army Air Corps request for an unusual configuration. The Vultee design won the competition, beating the Curtiss XP-55 Ascender and the Northrop XP-56 Black Bullet. Vultee designated it Model 84, a descendant of their earlier Model 78. After completing preliminary engineering and wind tunnel tests, a contract for a prototype was awarded on 8 January 1941. A second prototype was ordered on 17 March 1942. Although it appeared to be a radical design, performance was lackluster, and the project was canceled.

The XP-54 was designed with a pusher engine in the aft part of the fuselage. The tail was mounted rearward between two mid-wing booms, with the twelve-foot propeller between them. The design included a "ducted wing section" developed by the NACA to potentially enable installation of cooling radiators and intercoolers in the inverted gull wing. The Pratt & Whitney X-1800 engine was proposed as the powerplant, but after its development, was discontinued. The liquid-cooled Lycoming XH-2470 was substituted.

In September 1941, the XP-54 mission was changed from low-altitude to high-altitude interception. Consequently, a turbo-supercharger and heavier armor was added, and empty weight increased to 18,000 lb (5,200 to 8,200 kg).

The XP-54 was unique in numerous ways. The pressurized cockpit required a complex entry system: the pilot's seat acted as an elevator for cockpit access from the ground. The pilot lowered the seat electrically, sat in it, and raised it into the cockpit. Bail-out procedure was complicated by the pressurization system, necessitating a downward ejection of the pilot and seat to clear the propeller arc. [1] Also, the nose section could pivot through the vertical, three degrees up and six degrees down. In the nose, two 37 mm T-9 cannon were in rigid mounts while two .50 cal machine guns were in movable mounts. Movement of the nose and machine guns was controlled by a special compensating gun sight. Thus, the cannon trajectory could be elevated without altering the flight attitude of the airplane. The large nose section gave rise to its whimsical nickname, the Swoose Goose, inspired by a song about Alexander who was half-swan and half-goose: "Alexander was a swoose." – a name shared with the oldest surviving B-17.

Flight tests of the first prototype, 41-1210, began on 15 January 1943. Trials showed performance to be substantially below guarantees. Simultaneously, development of the XH-2470 engine was discontinued. Although the Allison V-3420 engine could be substituted, that required substantial airframe changes. Projected delay and costs resulted in a decision to not consider production buys.

The prototypes continued to be used in an experimental program until problems with the Lycoming engines and lack of spare parts caused termination. The second prototype, 42-108994 (but mistakenly painted as 42-1211) equipped with an experimental GE supercharger, made ten flights before it was relegated to a "parts plane" to keep the first prototype in the air. [2]


Vultee Vengeance - development, overview and US Service - History

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This book describes the extraordinary combat career of the American-built Vultee Vengeance dive-bomber in both the Royal Air Force and Indian Air Force service during the Burma Campaigns of 1942-45. This single-engine, all-metal aircraft was ordered by the Ministry of Supply during the darkest days of World War II when the lethal German combination of Junkers Ju.87 Stuka and Panzer tank forces had conquered most of Europe in a campaign that lasted a mere few weeks and the invasion of Britain was considered imminent.

The RAF had invented the dive-bomber concept in 1917 but had consistently rejected it in the inter-war period with the obsession of heavy bombing predominating official thinking almost exclusively. By the time the Vengeance arrived a still-reluctant RAF was seeking a precision bomber to prevent a repeat of the Japanese Naval attacks in the Indian Ocean and six squadrons were set up to counter this threat. With the Japanese on the borders of Burma and India, these aircraft, no longer required for the original role, proved by far and away the most accurate bomber aircraft operated by the British up to that time.

The Allied Armies on the ground, including Orde Wingate&rsquos Chindits, clamoured for their continued use and considered them essential, but in vain, and by 1945 all had been replaced. Their achievements have been ignored, falsified or scorned ever since but here, from eyewitness accounts and official records, is their full and true story.

A fascinating look at a largely overlooked aircraft of the second world war. Full of comprehensive data of squadrons including the crews and the aircrafts themselves. Peter Smiths level of research and the dedication it must have taken to write this book is very apparent as you read through it.

Read the full review here

Vintage Airfix

. the sheer depth and breadth of research and information in the book means it's a superb history of the type.

Airfix Model World, May 2020

The Vultee Vengeance is one of the lesser known aircraft in RAF service during WWII. This dive bomber was acquired from the US by the British Purchasing Commission in the darkest days of the war and played an important role later in the Far East in support of the Chindits special forces – Highly Recommended

Featured in

Royal Air Force Historical Society, Journal 72

Peter Smith has produced a remarkable work about the Vultee Model 72, A-31, A-35 Vengeance dive bomber entitled The Vultee Vengeance In Battle, published by Pen & Sword. In it's 8 chapters of 324 pages, he covers the origins and development of the aircraft from the Armee de l'Air specifications to the ever changing RAF demands. Six specific combat squadrons and their operations are discussed in detail. I hadn't realized how accurate and effective this 0° angle of incidence dive bomber was and how important its service had been. This book brings to light the true value of this unsung aircraft. There is a map of Far East operations and 32 photos along with text that covers its use by the IAF, RAF, RAAF, Free French, USAAF and Brazilian Air Force.

Japanese Aviation Society

It stands as superb piece of research and a fitting response to the type's detractors.

Read the full review here

Damien Burke, author of TSR2 - Britain's Last Bomber

Fantastically detailed written text. I would urge you to pick this up.

Watch the full video review here

Scale Modelling Now

Vultee Vengeance Crash Site

This place has historic significance. On 17 August 1944 the Vultee Vengeance from No 25 Squadron, Pearce, took off on a routine flight to Corrigin and return to make weather observations. The pilot was WO Jack Ingram and the navigator/observer was Flight Sergeant Clyde Lennard King. From Corrigan the plane turned north but was caught in dense cloud formation. The fuel situation became critical. From a break in the clouds an area of dense scrub with no sign of habitation was sited. The pilot decided that he and the navigator should bale out The Vultee Vengeance is a cumbersome aircraft and has to roll to allow the crew to bale out. Ingram landed safely but no sign of King has ever been found.
Ingram remained where he had landed till the following morning when he headed west through dense scrub. On reaching a burnt clearing he staked out his parachute. A chance remark from a commercial airline pilot led to the finding of the parachute 80km east of Narembeen. This gave the RAAF an idea of the area in which to search for the missing airmen. After walking for two days Ingram reached a farm house and was lifted to safety.
A massive search for navigator King was instigated. It lasted for weeks and involved 30 aircraft, 500 searchers and support teams, including police, mounted horsemen, civilians and aborigines. No sign of King was ever found. The tattered shreds of a parachute were found 30km from the crash site. Later a fire went through the area destroying any further evidence.
The wreckage of the plane covered four hectares. The engine was embedded three metres in the ground. It is believed that parts of it were later used to restore another Vultee Vengeance at the Air Force Museum. The Yilgarn Shire has erected a monument at the site.

Physical Description

94km south of Southern Cross on the road to Hyden is King-Ingram Road. This leads to the site of the crash of an RAAF Vultee Vengeance dive bomber and the unsolved mystery of what happened to the navigator. Very little remains of the plane - only small pieces of metal and evidence of soil disturbance.


Vultee Vengeance - development, overview and US Service - History

Figure 50 . Grumman FM-2 Wildcat.

Figure 51 . Douglas A-24B Invader.

[ 23 ] . were of a short duration with the objective to obtain data concerning problems with a specific aircraft. The collection of post-war aircraft is shown in figures 54-63.

Stability and control and flying qualities evaluations were carried out on a number of high-performance propeller and jet aircraft, including the XBT2D-1 (Skyraider prototype), F6U-1 Pirate, F7F-3 Tigercat, F8F-1 Bearcat, F-84C Thunderjet, F-84F-5-RE Thunderstreak, and the F5D-1 Skylancer. The F8F-1 was also used to examine buffet, including tests with the propeller feathered and engine shut down to permit the aerodynamic contribution to be identified. The F-86A Sabre underwent stall and spin testing. The prototype of the Boeing 707 commercial jet transport, the 367-80, was used for developing flying qualities criteria pertaining to large transport aircraft designs. That program was run by Hervey Quigley.

Several specialized tests were performed for a variety of purposes. In this category, the F-100C T-ALCS demonstrated a normal acceleration-command control system. The T-33A-5 Shooting Star performed zero-g flights and was used for pilot physiological studies. Tail-load tests were carried out on the XR60-1 Constitution. Finally, the L-4 Cub was used in evaluations of a castering landing gear for takeoff with 90 degree crosswind. The latter was one of Bill McAvoy's final test programs.

Two studies were carried out on the B-47 Stratojet, one concerning measurement and prediction of response characteristics of a flexible airplane to elevator control (ref. 43), the second on experimental and predicted longitudinal and lateral-directional response characteristics of a swept-wing airplane (ref. 44). The results provided an indication of the detail required in the analytical models to adequately predict the aeroelastic behavior of the airplane. These studies were carried out by Henry Cole and Stuart Brown and were performed jointly with the NASA High Speed Flight Station. All flights for both programs were conducted at Edwards Air Force Base.

These focused test programs served a useful purpose for the manufacturers and the military in resolving problems with the various designs. Along with them, more enduring efforts were carried out at Ames that had a broader impact on the technology. In one case, tests in the 7- by 10-foot wind tunnel were used to develop predictions of flying qualities, particularly concerning the influence of propeller slipstream effects on stability and control. Harry Goett, Roy Jackson, and Steve Belsley published the summary report of this work (ref. 45), which instigated flight tests with a number of aircraft, most extensively with the Navy's twin-engine patrol aircraft, the PV-1, and lent credibility to the prediction methods (refs. 46 and 47). The flights showed that the wind tunnel results anticipated the unsatisfactory longitudinal characteristics attributed to high control forces in maneuvers and landings. Power effects were confirmed to be critical contributions. The high aileron and rudder forces, which adversely affected roll and engine-out directional control, were also substantiated. Examples of results from other programs which worked their way into the military's flying qualities design specification appear in references 48-57.

In 1947, the Octave Chanute award was given to Larry Clousing in recognition of his contributions to the flying qualities evaluations of a number of the early aircraft and for his work in aerodynamics experiments.

Figure 52 . Chance Vought F4U-4 Corsair.

Figure 55 . Douglas XBT2D-1 (Skyraider prototype).

Figure 56 . Grumman F8F-1 Bearcat.

Figure 57 . Taylorcraft L-4 Cub with Seth Anderson.

Figure 58 . North American F-86A Sabre.

Figure 59 . Lockheed XR60-1 Constitution.

Figure 60 . Vought F6U-1 Pirate.

Figure 61 . Republic F-84F-5-RE Thunderstreak.

Figure 62 . Vought F7U-3 Cutlass.

Figure 63 . Boeing 367-80 (prototype for the 707 jet transport).

Figure 64 . Mirror landing aid at Crows Landing, Calif.

As a consequence of its long involvement in flying qualities assessments of a wide variety of aircraft, Ames was called upon for specific projects that were of concern to the military services. One particular program stands out in this regard. In the mid-1950s, the Navy was intent on establishing the influence of flying qualities on the minimum acceptable approach speed for landing on an aircraft carrier, and turned to Ames to carry out the program. That effort, led by Maurie White, involved the evaluation of 10 aircraft in 41 different configurations. The Navy sent different aircraft every 2 months to Ames to be instrumented and flown in that program, 19 including the F4D-1, F7U-3, and F9F-6 in addition, the FJ-3 and F9F-4, which were also involved in boundary-layer control research, were also used. Along with these five, Ames flew five Air Force aircraft to broaden the sample, including the F-84F-5-RE, the F-86 E and F, the F-94C, and the F-100A. Configuration variations included flap type and setting, wing leading-edge configuration and flow-control devices, and boundary-layer control systems. In that experiment, extensive pilot opinion data were obtained concerning the stability and control characteristics that influenced the acceptable approach speed. The subsequent report (ref. 58) included comparisons with existing approach-speed selection criteria.

Most of the flights were conducted by George Cooper, Bob Innis, and Fred Drinkwater and took place at the remote test site at the Crows Landing Naval Auxiliary Landing Field in the central valley area east of Moffett Field. Figure 64 shows the mirror landing aid adjacent to the Crows Landing runway that was used for approach guidance. This program was one of the earliest in which ground-based simulation began to play a complementary role with flight test in assessing flying qualities. White and Drinkwater carried out a study of the effects on selection of approach speed using the most rudimentary device. The representation of the external visual scene was provided by a cathode ray tube, which presented an artificial horizon and an outline of the carrier deck. A voltmeter served as the airspeed indicator. Throttle and center stick controls were provided, the latter with fixed spring restraints, with the pilot sitting in front of the lot on a swiveling stool. Everything was linked through an analog computer that performed the computation of the aircraft's dynamic response. Still, the results that were obtained helped to generalize the results that were obtained in flight, and the two together gave a clear indication of the best choice for the desired approach speed. At the culmination of these activities, Drinkwater, Cooper, and Innis all presented their views on the subject in references 59 and 60, with Innis introducing a STOL transport, the YC-134A, to the collection of fighters surveyed. These three men, along with the other members of the research pilot staff as they appeared in 1955, are shown in figure 65.

Another extensive flying qualities investigation that involved an early simulator and a number of airplanes was Brent Creer's study of lateral control requirements. This was carried out on the F6F, F-86, F4D, T-37, F-100, and the P-80A. It also used the pitch-roll chair simulator, a new device with two rotational degrees of freedom, dubbed the NE2 for "any two" axes of motion. This study screened several candidate.

Figure 65 . Flight Operations Branch circa 1955. From left to right: Bob Innis, Don Heinle, Larry Clousing, Bill McAvoy, Fred Drinkwater, George Cooper.

. flying quality parameters and showed where motion simulation proved of value in the process (ref. 61).

In concluding this section, it is appropriate to highlight what may be the most important contribution of the flying qualities evaluation programs and experiments conducted on the variable stability aircraft at Ames. This, of course, was George Cooper's standardized system for rating an aircraft's flying qualities. Cooper developed his rating system over several years as a result of the need to quantify the pilot's judgment of an aircraft's handling in a fashion that could be used in the stability and control design process. This came about because of his perception of the value that such a system would have, and because of the encouragement of his colleagues in this country and in England who were familiar with his initial attempts. Characteristically, Harry Goett spurred Cooper on in pursuit of this objective.

Cooper's approach forced a specific definition of the pilot's task and of its performance standards. Further, it accounted for the demands the aircraft placed on the pilot in accomplishing a given task to some specified degree of precision. The Cooper Pilot Opinion Rating Scale was initially published in 1957 (ref. 62). After several [ 27 ] years of experience gained in its application to many flight and simulator experiments and through its use by the military services and aircraft industry, it was subsequently modified in collaboration with Robert (Bob) Harper of the Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory and became the Cooper-Harper Handling Qualities Rating Scale (fig. 66) in 1969 (ref. 63). This rating scale has been one of the enduring contributions of flying qualities research at Ames over the past 40 years the scale remains as the standard way of measuring flying qualities to this day. In recognition of his many contributions to aviation safety, Cooper received the Adm. Luis de Florez Flight Safety Award in 1966 and the Richard Hansford Burroughs, Jr., Test Pilot Award in 1971. After he retired, both he and Bob Harper were selected by the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics to reprise the Cooper-Harper Rating Scale in the 1984 Wright Brothers Lectureship in Aeronautics.

Figure 66 . Cooper-Harper Handling Qualities Rating Scale.

15 . Harry Goett and Bill Harper 1998: personal communication. 16 . Seth Anderson 1998: personal communication. 17 . George Cooper 1998: personal communication. 18 . Ron Gerdes 1998: personal communication. 19 . George Cooper 1998: personal communication.


Crusading as an Act of Vengeance, 1095-1216

‘I am the Lord thy God, mighty, jealous, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate me: And showing mercy unto thousands to them that love me, and keep my commandments’ (Ex. 20:5–6). Medieval crusaders, argues Susanna A. Throop in Crusading as an Act of Vengeance, viewed the biblical notion of the Lord’s vengeance with deadly earnestness and interpreted their own actions through the ‘vocabulary of vengeance’. In this book, based on her University of Cambridge dissertation, Throop seeks to dislodge the widely accepted position among crusade historians (in part, due to the magisterial work of her former advisor, Jonathan Riley-Smith) that the idea of crusading as an act of vengeance represented a largely secular phenomenon, developing among the ‘rude’ laity, one that peaked around the time of the First Crusade only to disappear as later generations of clerical authors refined the theology of crusading. Throop, to the contrary, declares that an interpretation of crusading as vengeance inhabited a vital place in the clerical as well as the lay imaginations, and that far from fading over the course of the 12th and early 13th centuries, the notion occupied an increasingly prominent place in crusade histories, chansons de geste, letters, poems, and other sources. Along the way, she makes a number of intriguing observations about the nature of religious violence and the place of crusading within medieval Christian ‘mytho-history’, suggesting some of the wider possibilities raised by her close reading of the vocabulary of vengeance and related terms.

As noted by Throop, Carl Erdman, in his highly influential 1935 work The Origin of the Idea of Crusading, judged the idea of crusading as an act of vengeance to be ‘an obvious improvisation suggestive of how immature the idea of crusading still was’.(1) Erdmann, followed by other scholars including Riley-Smith, Peter Partner, Jean Flori and others, associated this ‘immature’ idea squarely with the laity, part of their ‘feudal’ notions of honor, shame, and military obligation. Throop takes issue with this interpretation of the evidence. ‘The concept of crusading as vengeance’, she declares, ‘was no anomaly, and crusading was conceived as an act of vengeance not only through the application of ‘secular’ values, but also through values inherent in twelfth-century Christianity’ (p. 9). Or, as she puts it elsewhere: ‘Text after text suggests that it would be inaccurate to envision a heavy ideological dividing line separating a pro-vengeance laity from an anti-vengeance Church’ (p. 31). She seems to feel that by skirting the idea of crusading as vengeance, or writing it off as a product of ‘unlettered’ minds, historians have left medieval churchmen off the hook for their articulation of crusading not just as an act of love (in the famous formulation of Riley-Smith), but also as an act of hatred – hatred and a desire for revenge against Jews, Muslims, and heretics, those who crucified Christ, seized the place of his self-sacrifice, or denied his divinity.(2) Crusade studies, she observes, have focused on crusading as an act of ‘pilgrimage, penitential warfare, just war, holy war, the defense of the Church, liberation, Christian love, and the imitation of Christ’, approaches that attempt to reconcile modern ‘Christian values’ with bloody reality of crusading.(3) Examining crusading as an act of vengeance requires us to move a ‘step further’ down that road, to grasp how medieval Christians could see their faith as calling for them to take violent revenge against enemies of their community.

The stakes are large in this issue, complicated by modern assumptions about religious belief, violence, and the meaning of vengeance. Throop, to avoid the dangers of anachronism, cautiously limits her approach and methods by focusing on a set of ‘signposts,’ terms that she claims as having an equivalency to the modern English word ‘vengeance’ – vindicta, ultio, and venjance. She offers a working definition of what these words meant, and what ‘vengeance’ effectively means throughout her monograph: ‘violence (both physical and nonphysical) driven by a sense of moral authority, and in certain cases divine approbation, against those who are believed to question that authority and/or approbation’ (p. 12). Her reading of sources for the First Crusade and its aftermath, divided into ‘eye-witness’ and ‘non-participant’ accounts (a traditional division that some scholars are starting to question in terms of its value for historical analysis) leads her to conclude that the notion of crusading as vengeance was not nearly as widespread as modern scholars often assume in the ‘early years’ of crusading. This position, one should note, leaves her at odds with historiography on the anti-Jewish pogroms in the Rhineland during the First Crusade, often understood as the most clear-cut example of crusading as revenge, in this case against the Jews for killing Christ (pp. 64–70). Rather, she argues, through the writings of both crusaders and those who never went on crusade (monastic authors, in particular), the idea of crusading as an act of vengeance developed over time, increasing rather than decreasing as the 12th century progressed.

Her understanding of crusading as vengeance does not lead her to discount the idea of crusading as an act of love: to the contrary, Christian love (caritas) for one’s neighbor could fuel the desire for revenge against Muslims and others (p. 62). Indeed, these sort of uncomfortable pairings (uncomfortable, that is, for modern sensibilities) form an important component of her research. Later in the book, she examines the related term of zelus, ‘zeal’ for Christianity, for God, or for justice, as a ‘catalyst’ for the idea of crusading as an act of vengeance, tying together ‘love of God, anger at sin, a passion for justice, and the vocabulary of vengeance’ (p. 170). Through her careful exploration of that vocabulary, Throop concludes that there were wide-ranging, pre-existing ‘patterns of thought linking religion, emotion, and violence’ that offered ‘powerful motivating tools at the disposal of those who encouraged the crusading movement and sought a united Christendom, internally reformed and externally expanding’ (p. 169). Simply put, crusading as an act of vengeance made powerful sense for 12th- and 13th-century Christians, both lay and clerical, accounting for its appeal and increasing prominence.

Throop’s handling of her terms – primarily vindicta, ultio, venjance, and zelus – is convincing, although at points, her trawling of the sources that include those terms casts a rather indiscriminate net to yield her particular catch: In a few short pages, analyzing links of justice and vengeance, she quickly ranges from Thomas of Chobham to William of Tyre, to Robert of Clari and James of Vitry, and then to Gratian and Bernard of Clairvaux (pp. 16–19) or, in a single paragraph on zeal and anger, she jump centuries from Hincmar of Rheims to Thomas of Chobham without really alerting the reader to the differences in their historical context (p. 158). The repeated marshalling of anecdotes and pastiche of references for her vocabulary of vengeance makes for some odd moments, such as when the exact same passage from the 12th-century crusader account of the siege of Lisbon, De expugnatione Lyxbonensi, is used on consecutive pages, to make similar points, apparently without cognizance of each other (pp. 106–7). Some readers might wish that she spent more time situating her various texts and authors, locating their notions of vengeance within the broader frame of their particular time and place. That said, Throop is quite explicit that her ‘deliberate goal has been to identify broad cultural themes, rather than individual proclivities’ (p. 8). Her search for vengeance through her terms also anchors her attempt to avoid anachronistic interpretations of vengeance colored by modern emotions and value-judgments. As she notes in her introduction: ‘It is worth repeating that I have not myself interpreted events as being ‘vengeful’ or ‘acts of vengeance’ (p. 6). The sources, she implies, speak for themselves. Of course, as Throop no doubt realizes, sources never speak for themselves, even when the modern historian conscientiously tries to avoid warping his or her evidence through anachronism. On the positive side, her caution avoids projecting modern notions of vengeance back into the past. The price paid for this approach, however, is a sometimes limited scope of historical analysis, heavy on the parsing of terms, without the rewarding pay-off that pushes beyond the parts to grasp a greater whole. At points, one wishes that Throop had taken a little more interpretative risk, making scholarly calls about the significance of vengeance, even when the precise terminology she highlights is not present.

Nevertheless, at some tantalizing points, Throop’s analysis of vengeance leads to some insightful claims about the relationship between crusading, vengeance, and memory, with a specific eye toward the relationship between Christianity and Islam. Divine vengeance, she rightly observes, struck sinners, including Christians themselves when they violated God’s laws. Both Christians and Muslims, by this logic, operated within the same redemptive and retributive economy of salvation, suggesting that ‘Muslims were not the others, but rather those of us who are doing wrong’ (p. 56 emphasis is her own). This is a striking claim that deserves more consideration. In the Book of Exodus, for example, God punishes the Egyptians without any suggestion that they were also his ‘Chosen People,’ only doing wrong. At the same time, undoubtedly, Throop captures something important about medieval Christian theology of history, in the sense that its inclusive universalism always sits paradoxically alongside self-definition through exclusion. The ambivalent relationship between Judaism and Christian offered a particularly fraught example of this tension, but a similar problem inhabited the Christian sense of Muslims as providential actors in salvation history: were Muslims to be killed or converted? Damned or saved? Were they pagans or a derivative of Christian heresy?

As Throop also observes, vengeance happens because it forms part of a story. As a ‘reaction to a prior event (real or imagined),’ she observes, ‘vengeance was always embedded in a chronological context’ (p. 13). For an individual such as a feudal lord, that event might fit into a personal narrative of violation, anger, and revenge (à la Stephen White, Richard Barton, and Daniel Smail). Within the context of crusading, however, the chronological context for vengeance reaches the level of what Throop (following Riley-Smith) calls ‘mytho-history,’ the ‘narrative framework underlying contemporary culture in the Christian West that assigned meaning and order to historical events on the basis of religious belief’ (pp. 101–2). The sweep of biblical history, including the crucifixion, the sack of Jerusalem by Roman armies under Titus and Vespasian, the Islamic conquest of the holy places thereby intersected with the ideology of crusading as an act of vengeance. This meta-narrative, including the ‘common theme of creating a world united by ‘true’ Christian faith through the means of just war and conversion’ (p. 135), meant that the medieval Latin theological imagination could assign the bloodiest of crusaders a moral purpose in God’s plan for history. Indeed, considering her claim that vengeance equally involved clerical thinkers, not just the laity, one might have expected to see even more about the importance of the Bible, exegesis, and Latin historical thinking for notions of vengeance. As Throop herself notes, much of Philippe Buc’s current work is wrestling with precisely this sort of ‘exegetical perspective,’ yielding considerable insights into the ‘relationship between Christian sacred texts and the concept of vengeance’ (p. 192).

At moments, therefore, Throop does throw some ‘big questions’ into the mix about religion, emotion, violence, history, and memory, set within the context of the dynamic 12th century. In her conclusion, she looks forward to a wider-ranging synthesis that might situate her own topic of crusading as vengeance within broader parameters. As she observes:

The last century of scholarship have seen the emergence of the twelfth-century ‘renaissance,’ ‘reformation,’ ‘revolution,’ and, most recently, ‘crisis.’ As it happens, the chronology of the development of the idea of crusading as vengeance coincided with a historical period of great intellectual regeneration, religious reformation, increasing Church power, shifting political structures, and increasing violent persecution. No one yet, to my knowledge, has worked to integrate the overall historiography of the twelfth-century with our evolving understanding of twelfth-century crusading (pp. 184–5).

This is a desirable goal, and whether Throop undertakes this task herself, or leaves it to others, in Crusading as an Act of Vengeance, she has done a valuable service to scholars who wish to tackle the crusades and the dilemma of religious violence.


Shia Islam

With the death of Husayn, Muhammad's grandson, in Karbala, the first attempt to put an Alid (a descendant of Ali) in control over the Islamic empire had failed. Their supporters continued to challenge the Umayyads who had emerged victorious and succeeded in gaining power over the entire Islamic world. Ali's cause did not come first for all supporters of these rebellions. Many had other reasons for opposing the Umayyads, such as the Umayyad favoritism for their family, Syria, and the Arabs the Alids offered the most obvious alternative.

Kufa in particular became a center for resistance. The historian Heinz Halm sees the beginnings of Shiism as a religious community in this region in the 680s when a movement of 'penitents' (Arabic: tawwabun) appeared who demanded revenge for Husayn and wanted to atone with swords in their hands for having let him down.Initially a movement of a small number of elderly men, it turned into a rebellion with broader support, but it was crushed by the Umayyads in 685. Eventually this public display of solidarity and grief would become a distinctive feature of Shiite public religiosity.

Iraq during the formative period is also the backdrop against which Shiism developed one of its most distinctive features, the concept of the Hidden Imam. Unlike Sunni Islam, where the term imam commonly denotes the leader of prayer, in Shiism the Imam is a descendant of Ali and seen as the politico-religious leader of the entire community. A line of historical figures who were highly respected scholars and later identified as Imams was put on hold when one of them (Shiite sects disagree about the point in the line where this took place) went into Occultation (hiding). One of the aspects of this crucial figure is its apocalyptic character. For many Shiites, the Hidden Imam is the Mahdi who appears at the end of time and restores justice. He is also referred to as al-Qaim, 'he who arises'. Sometimes a difference is made between mahdis who temporarily restore justice and the Mahdi-Qaim who ushers in the final period of grace.

While Sunnis share the belief in such a figure (although he is not expected to take revenge for the injustice the Shiites suffered), the appearance of mahdis as leaders of political movements is usually associated with Shiism, although the leaders were not necessarily Shiites. The rebellion of the Sudanese Mahdi against the Turco-Egyptian government in the 1880s is a well-known example of a Sunni Mahdi. In post-invasion Iraq, one of the most powerful forces in the country is called the Mahdi army (led by the Shiite Moktada al-Sadr). The Mahdi is also mentioned in the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The earliest attested case in Islamic history in which Mahdism played such a role is the rebellion of Mukhtar in Kufa.

In 685, Mukhtar, an Arab, had started his rebellion in the name of Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyya who, Mukhtar claimed, was the Mahdi. Ibn al-Hanafiyya dissociated himself from the revolt. It is noteworthy that though he was a son of Ali, his mother was not Fatima, but rather a slave. Unlike the men who became later the Shiite Imams, he was thus not a descendant of Muhammad, which indicates an early tendency to highlight Ali as an ancestor rather than Muhammad.

One of Mukhtar's slogans was vengeance for Husayn. He challenged not only the Umayyad caliph Abd Malik, who had only just succeeded to the throne, but also his strong rival Abdallah ibn al-Zubayr in Mecca, who claimed the caliphate for himself. Supporters of Mukhtar included the population of Kufa, who might have felt guilty for having denied Husayn their support, as well as non-Arab converts to Islam. In 687, the rebellion was suppressed by the troops of Ibn al-Zubayr. In the aftermath of these events and the death of Ibn al-Hanafiyya in 700, supporters of the Alids continued to pin their hopes on this elusive Mahdi, who, they claimed, was hiding in a cave only to return and fill the world with justice. In the following years similar stories were told about other leaders of rebellions. The belief in a redeemer hiding either in the material world or a remote metaphysical sphere became one of the most characteristic features of Shiism, although it is not key to the beliefs of many modern Shiites.


J.G. Brill Company

The J.G. Brill Company became a leader in the streetcar industry for its development and construction of lightweight and inexpensive cars.

Like most car builders such as the St. Louis Car Company and Cincinnati Car Company, Brill focused mostly on streetcar designs and less so on interurban equipment due to the fact that there was a larger market for the former.

The company's history dated back to the industry's infancy in 1860s when horses were still the primary means of motive power, hauling carriages through dirt or muddy streets.

While Brill got its start building horse-drawn streetcars and was poised to reap the profits from the electrified street railway boom in the late 19th century and began building heavier and longer equipment to match.

It also constructed passenger equipment for main line railroads and even buses in later years. As the industry declined in the 1920s and 1930s, so did the J.G. Brill. After various mergers the company finally disappeared altogether in 1954.

Philadelphia Suburban Transportation Company "Brilliner" #206 hustles past the former Philadelphia & Western shops in Upper Darby, Pennsylvania on September 2, 1965. This scene was taken from the Victory Avenue overpass. Roger Puta photo.

The history of the J.G. Brill began in 1869, in Philadelphia, when John George Brill and son George opened the J.G. Brill & Company to accommodate the growing streetcar systems popping up around the country.

John had a somewhat extensive background in the industry even at this time as he had built early streetcars for the W.C. Allison & Sons Company.

As mentioned above, at the time these operations were very small, serving mostly small to medium-sized towns, and operating with horse or mule power.


V-2 rocket

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V-2 rocket, German in full Vergeltungswaffen-2 (“Vengeance Weapon 2”), also called V-2 missile or A-4, German ballistic missile of World War II, the forerunner of modern space rockets and long-range missiles.

Developed in Germany from 1936 through the efforts of scientists led by Wernher von Braun, it was first successfully launched on October 3, 1942, and was fired against Paris on September 6, 1944. Two days later the first of more than 1,100 V-2s was fired against Great Britain (the last on March 27, 1945). Belgium was also heavily bombarded. About 5,000 people died in V-2 attacks, and it is estimated that at least 10,000 prisoners from the Mittelbau-Dora concentration camp died when used as forced labour in building V-2s at the underground Mittelwerk factory. After the war, both the United States and the Soviet Union captured large numbers of V-2s and used them in research that led to the development of their missile and space exploration programs.

The V-2 was 14 metres (47 feet) long, weighed 12,700–13,200 kg (28,000–29,000 pounds) at launching, and developed about 60,000 pounds of thrust, burning alcohol and liquid oxygen. The payload was about 725 kg (1,600 pounds) of high explosive, horizontal range was about 320 km (200 miles), and the peak altitude usually reached was roughly 80 km (50 miles). However, on June 20, 1944, a V-2 reached an altitude of 175 km (109 miles), making it the first rocket to reach space. See also rockets and missile systems: The V-2. For contemporary accounts of V-2 bombings of London as recorded in the Britannica Book of the Year, see BTW: London Classics: London in World War II.


INTRODUCTIONWhat is a personal network and how does it help me in my personal performance?How can I develop one effectively?What kind of people do I need to include in my network?What characteristics do I need to run a network?Are there any .

Author: Sapiens Editorial

Publisher: Sapiens Editorial

INTRODUCTIONWhat is a personal network and how does it help me in my personal performance?How can I develop one effectively?What kind of people do I need to include in my network?What characteristics do I need to run a network?Are there any plans that help me achieve the goals I have in mind?WHAT WILL YOU LEARN?This text points out the importance of personal networks to achieve a successful professional career, as well as the characteristics they must have: loyalty and generosity among members, thinking about helping members rather than oneself and having some "superconnector" members. For their part, the networker must be a sociable and patient person, they must have a personal brand with a unique message to accompany that brand.In addition, given that the ultimate goal is to have a successful career, we touch on the goals and the reasons why we establish them. Following this theme, the author proposes a Network Action Plan, which will help us to follow a series of activities that will help us achieve the objectives we want.In the same way, it is emphasized that individuals should not forget their passion, but rather we should find a way to combine them with our activities to achieve a professional career with which we are satisfied.ABOUT THE ORIGINAL BOOKThe main theme of this book is the importance of personal networks on the road to success. Throughout this text, you will find suggestions that will help you develop your network.In addition, the author will propose the structure of a plan that allows us to work intelligently to meet our objectives.Finally, the necessary elements will be established so that each individual develops their own personal brand.ABOUT KEITH FERRAZZI: THE AUTHOR OF THE ORIGINAL BOOKFrom humble origins, Keith Ferrazzi began his professional life by applying the principles he shares in this book: creating a social network that would allow him to help other people. This process allowed him to develop and master the tools to develop this type of organization. Currently, he is a successful businessman and is considered to be an expert in the field of marketing. This book is based on the beliefs of Ferrazzi, who maintains that generosity is the basic pillar of a successful career.Throughout his text, we will find tips and the structure that the author himself followed to become the successful man he is today.

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